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Union involvement in health issues: 
The VIC RAIL Asbestos Dispute 
John Benson* 
This article examines the VJC RAIL Asbestos Dispute which took place in Victoria, 
Australia during 19 77-78. The dispute was significant in that the general awar:eness gener-
ated by the union campaign and the publicity given by the media, was instrumental in 
securing workers' demands. It also illustrated the need for workers and union officials to 
carefully assess the dange.rs present on the job; a task that cannot be left solely to manage-
ment or the government. 
Introduction 
In Australia, as in most west,em countries, the issues of occupational health and safety 
have been sadly neglected. The reasons for this are varied but in general stem from the feel-
ing that injuries were accidents of fate 1 and this, coupled with inadequate statistics, led to 
a tacit acceptance of the problem. The ·effect has been for our society to view industrial 
health in terms of the ability of employees to continue in the production process {Dreitzel, 
i 971 ), w_ith the result that empl~yers .only considered safeguards when the viability of the 
business undertaking was seriously t};ueateiled. Unions also had been preoccupied with 
economic concerns and regarded safety issues as peripheral to their traditional concern 
with wages and conditions. When .safety issues did arise the emphasis was on "'dirt money" 
or compensation, rather than the prevention or reduction of risk. Given the attitude of 
employers and unions towards occupational health and safety, goverrunents saw fit only to 
enact the minimum of legislation. This legislation, often relying on self regulation, proved 
ineffective, for not only were the provisions inadequate and inspection facilities virtually 
non-existent, but there was a distinct lack <lf formal provisions for worker education on the 
dangers inherent in the industrial environment. Occupational health was thus seen primarily 
as the responsibility of the individual employee. 
In r,ecent years th·e situation has changed, albeit slowly, Governments are now recog-
nising the need to have more than an assortment of Factory Acts on their legislative 
records, with some Australian states having passed detailed legislation, for example the 
1972 South Australian Industrial Safety, Health and Welfare Act. Individual unions have 
also begun to develop health and safety policies with the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) in 1979 adopting its frrst policy on occupational health. The impetus for 
such changes is varied, but issues such as the Victorian Railways (VIC RAIL) Blue Train 
Asbestos Dispute of 1977-1978 have been instrumental in generating awareness of the 
dangers of our industrial working environment and the need for employee protection 
through worker involvement and legal regulation. . 
• Le~urer in lndust~l Relations, Gippsland Institute of Advanced Education, Olurchill, Victoria, 
Australia 3842. I am mdebted to the anonymous referees of this journal and to my colleagues at the 
Department of Management, Lanchester Polytechnic, Coventry, United Kingdom for their helpful 
suggestions and aiticism. 
1 For example: 
any chain of events, ~ow_ever well planned, may include some unplanned event. It may be the 
result of some nonadjusttve act on the part of an individual, some malfunction of a machine 
or some situation in which we are unprepared for a contingency. (Gilmer, 1'971, p. 515) ' 
\ 
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The VIC RAIL Asbestos Dispute was significant for two reasons. First, the general 
awareness generated by the union campaign and the publicity given by the media was 
instrumental ~ workers' demands, both in VIC RAIL and other organisations, for pro-
tection as well as removal and substitution of asbestos products, being met. Second, it 
illustrated the need for workers and union officials to carefully assess the dangers present 
on the job; a task that cannot be left solely in the hands of management or the government. 
The unfortunate aspect of this dispute was that it was avoidable, as evidence of asbestos 
related illnesses was available at the time of the train's construction. 
This paper will examine this dispute and attempt to locate it in the context of these 
wider considerations. The firSt section briefly discusses the dangers of asbestos and the 
development of asbestos standards. The second section examines the dispute in some 
detail paying particular attention to the positions adopted by VIC RAIL, the Victorian 
Government and the unions involved, nantely the Australian Railways Union (ARU), the 
Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights Union (AMWSU) and the Electrical Trades 
Union (ETU). The final section provides a brief analysis of the roles of the Industrlal 
Hygiene Division of the Victoria Health Commission (IHD), the Australian Concl1iation 
and Arbitration Commission (ACAC) and the significance of this dispute in subsequent 
industrial health matters. 
Asbestos: Dangers and Standards 
Asbestos is the name given to a group of naturally occurring mineral silicates that 
crystallize into silky fibres between layers of rock. The very properties that m•ke it : 
low cost, strength, stability in acids or alkalis and heat resistance, also underlie the 
ous nature of the substance. These properties have led to its widespread use, 2 but it ia this 
virtual indestructible nature of asbestos that has caused severe medical problema adaioa 
whenever it is inhaled or ingested. This is aptly summarised by Gillespie (undated p. 7) 11 
''miracle fibre-killer dust". 
Asbestos is now recognised medically as representing a severe health threat (Inter-
national Agency for Research on Cancer, 1977; Morgan, 1975). However knowledge of 
the hazards of asbestos is not new: 
The fmt case of asbestosis was diagnosed by an English doctor back in 1900, lea 
than 20 years after the asbestos industry had been established. Other were 
noted in Europe and North America in the ensuing years, so that by 1917 Canadian 
and United States insurance companies were no longer insuring asbestos workm 
because of the recognised health hazards associated with the industry. 
1980,p.32) 
• 
What is recent, is the public concern over the dangers of asbestos. This bighHghts the 
fact that scientific knowledge alone will afford little protection to those at risk with the 
onus falling on "others" to prove that a substance is dangerous. Companies with a 
interest in the mining of asbestos and the manufacture of asbestos-related products cannot 
be relied upon to provide self-critical information. In the same way, neither can 
bodies that make use of asbestos products. Successive governments, in Australia, both state 
and tederal, have for years been aware of the health problems associated with asbestos but 
have done little more than legislate for voluntary regulation. In Victoria, gowmment 
authorities like VIC RAIL and the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) haw 
n1ade extensive use of asbestos products and consequently would be faced with huae out-
lays if Parliament enacted comprehensive legislation. Thus, without access to the neceaary 
information and the support of government, the task of generating public awuen• ill 
extren1ely difficult. 
2 It has been calculated that asbestos in its various forms has over 3,000 useL Some common u• are. 
sheet building materials, car brake linings and clutch plates, vinyl floor tOea, fireproof bulldiDa iDP•I,.. 
ion, lagging for pi~s, and sprayed insulation for rue and sound proofina in buUdlql and allo lD tralna (See: Rosato, 1959) 
Union involvement in health issues S9 
Medical problems directly associated with asbestos can be broken into asbestosis; a 
scarring of the lungs, and cancer, in~cluding mesothelioma; a rare form of lung and stomach 
cancer. Asbestosis was clearly established as an occupational disease by 1930 as a result of 
an investigation by members of the British Factory Inspectorate (Merwether and Price, 
1930). Fallowing this a number of studies began to link cancer with asbestos, which not 
only established "asbestos caused lung cancer" (Doll, 1955, pp. 81-86), but also r,evealed 
that low levels of exposure wer~e significant and thus established the non-occupational 
hazards of asbestos (Wagner, 1960, pp. 260-271).3 Whilst all forms of asbestos are linked 
with both asbestosis and cancer it does appear that crocidolite or blue asbestos is the most 
dangerous form (National Health and Medical Research Council, undated). An unfortunate 
aspect of asbestos-related illnesses is that apart from being incurable, signs of the illness 
often do not appear for many y~ears. As a consequence medical complaints are not always 
related to earlier asbestos exposure thus making more difficult preventative measures or at 
least the awareness of the need for such measures. 
What then constitutes an acceptable level of airborn,e asbestos fibres under which no 
protective action need be taken? The World Health ~Organisation has stated that there 
exists no safe level of exposure to asbestos dust (Workers' Health Centre, undated), but 
the acceptance of a standard will be based on two facto is, namely; the measurement of the 
risk to workers expose~ to asbestos, and what constitutes an acc~ptable risk. As Lowrance 
(1976, pp. 75-76) points out, the former "is an empirical, scientific activity" whilst the 
latter constitutes a "normative, political activity". Thus the establishment of a standard 
will not depend solely on medical or scientific evidence but on the whole range of activities. 
. 
-operative in the political process. 
In 1969 the British Government adopted a chrysotile (white asbestos) standard of 
2 fibres/mi. That is the number of airborne asbestos fibres per millilitre of air must not 
e~ceed two without protective action taking place.4 Many countries have since adopted 
this standard as the level of acceptable risk they are prepared to assume. Australia was slow 
to respond with Queensland in 1971 becoming the fust state to introduce some asbestos 
regulations. This legislation required notification of asbestos use, ventilation., cleanliness 
and protective clothing, although no specific dust limit was set. South Australia followed in 
1976 with a limit of 4 fibres/ml, with New South Wales adopting a limit of 2 fibres/ml, 
in 1978. (Gunningham, 1978, pp. 46-49) At the time the VIC RAIL dispute arose, 
Victoria did not have asbestos regulations, nor were there any proposed. Queensland and 
South Australia by this stage had banned the use of crocidolite {blue asbestos). 
In the final analy:sis it will be those working with asbestos who will decide the level of 
tolerable risk. This is illustrated dramatically in the case of British Rail. For blue asbestos 
the British Factory Inspectorate standard was 0.2 fibres/ml, however British Rail adopted 
in 1967, after considerable union pressure, the more stringent standard of 0.05 fibres/mi. 
The Dispute: Background, Issues and Their Resolution 
I 
VIC RAIL, as with many other large inaustrial undertakings, has made extensive use of 
asbestos and asbestos-related products. Of particular concern in this dispute was the use of 
asbestos as lining and insulation in what are known as the Harris (Blue) trains. 
From 1957 to 1962 VIC RAIL imported about 90 Harris carriages from the United 
IGngdom and assembled another 130 at their Newport workshops. Blue asbestos in these 
carriages was used as insulation, being sprayed on the inside of the exterior walls from floor 
to ceiling. Carriages assembled after 1962 did not contain asbestos insulation as the Health 
Department had warned VIC RAIL that it could be dangerous. 5 This matter was frrst 
3 Wagner found that people not working in the mines but living in close proximity also contracted 
mesothelioma 
4 This means based on current medical evidence that 50 years exposure to this quantity will produce 
the earliest signs of asbestosis in 1 percent of the workforce. 
5 St~tem~nts attribut~d. to the General Manager - VIC RAIL (The Age, 1 February, 1978, p. 5) and 
the Vtctonan Health Mtruster (The Herald, 2 February, 1978, p. 5). 
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raised in 1957 and arrangements were made for all employees involved with asbestos to be 
X-rayed and medically examined. In fact VIC RAIL was alerted to the problems of asbestos 
as early as 1953 (Peacock, 1978, p. 127), although at this stage neither the workers nor the 
unions were notified. 
The medical examinations of the 70 men involved in the construction of the Harris 
trains were conducted by Dr Bryan Gandevia of the Royal Melbourne Hospital. On the 
basis of this work he concluded that the risks of asbestosis were mDd. In relation to the 
1977-78 dispute he qualified his earlier fmdings by stating: 
The different problem, of a relationship of mesotheHoma to crocidolite, was not then 
accepted. 
and 
In the light of later information I would regard the exposure to blue asbestos u 
probably carrying a significant risk of mesothelioma. 6 
Thus whilst VIC RAIL may not have realised in 1957-58 the precise dangers of exposure 
to asbestos, a number of subsequent events should have alerted VIC RAIL to these prob-
lems and to develop appropriate policies. These events include: 
(a) improved knowledge of asbestos related diseases, especially mesothelioma; 
{b) the publicity surrounding the closing down of the WittenoOJn Blue Asbestos ntlne in 
Western Australia in 1966; 
(c) the official diagnosis that the death of two VIC RAIL employees was due to ubeato"•. 
(Another employee has retired due to the effects of asbestosis and a fowth employee bas 
developed mesothelioma.) All these workers were employed on the assembly of the Harris 
trains and workers' compensation was awarded to two of thexn. (Gillespie, un-
dated, p. 48); and 
(d) the banning of the use of blue asbestos by British Rail in 1967. (Ten yean later, in 
1977, British Rail announced that over the next four yean it would spend some 30 mdlion 
pounds removing asbestos from all trains built prior to the ban. 7 ) 
In 1971 VIC RAIL commenced a programme of remodelling the Harris carriages for lllf' 
in the Melbourne Underground Loop. The operation, carried out in the Bendigo worksbopa, 
involved removing partitions and cutting doors in both ends of the carriages. The workers, 
unaware of the dangers, had negotiated a special "dirt allowance" and apart from the 
occasional use of a cartridge type respirator were working unprotected. Six yean passed 
until in June 1977 a dispute arose concerning this special aDowance; it appeared VIC RAIL 
wanted to cut the allowance. The local shop stewards contacted their union, the ARU, and 
an organiser was dispatched to the Bendigo workshops. The official reported back that tbe 
men were working in "a most unsatifactory situation" in what appealed to be abeatos 
dust. The union responded by placing immediate bans on further conversion work and 
reporting the problem to the Industrial Hygiene Division of the Victorian Com-
mission. A subsequent union instigated analysis confmned that the insulation wu blue 
asbestos, although it was several weeks later that the DID accompanied by a VIC RAIL 
medical off.icer went to Bendigo to carry out investigations. The ARU, porhape Dlively, 
expected a quick response; however this was not the case. It would not be until February 
1978 that the test results were known. 
During the remaining part of 1977 a stalemate developed. The bans tn force, 
the ARU made at least two requests to VIC RAIL for the results of DID but tile reply 
was the same; "they were not yet available". The worken at Bendigo aiiO made~ 
requests at the local level, as one worker put it: 
We've been treated with arrogance and ignorance. When I uked the Manaaer IIMJut 
the results, first he hadn't heard anything. Then he said, 'Oh what do you waat 
know for?' and then we had the chap up from town, from the Safety Fipt 
6 Letter from Professor Gandevia to Mr J Frazer, 6 March 1978. 
7 The Age, 1 February, 1978, p. S. 
Union involvement in health issues 61 
Committee, and I asked him the same question and he said, 'What do you want to 
know for? If you know the answer, what are you going to do about it?' and we've 
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mum time staff were exposed to the levels, the IHD recommended that reapilato.y eqllipo. 
ment was only necessary when carrying out certain tasks. The unions rejected recom-
mendations maintaining that the only acceptable standard wu nn exposure, and that every 
worker was to have maximum protection regardless of the IHD recommendations. This 
position was understandable for not only were the unions concerned witb the bea1tb of 
their members but they also felt sure that political pressure was being brougbt to bear oa 
the IHD. 
Throughout the duration of the dispute the responsible minister remained ailent. When 
the matter was fust raised in Parliament, Mr Roper, for the Opposition, the 
Minister of Transport stated that he felt the advice given to him by the Minister of Health 
had let VIC RAIL down (Victorian Parliamentary Proceedings, 1978, pp. 571-572). 
Indeed VIC RAIL had stopped using blue asbestos in the Harris "In the early 
1960s after warnings that it could be dangerous."14 Why then the renewed to 
the union's claim? The secretary of the ARU, Mr Jim Frazer, felt that VIC RAIL WB 
being wrongly advised by the Department of Health, with Gillespie (undated, p. 51) con-
cluding that the reason behind this was that pressure was applied to the IHD to 11•ke 
recommendations that would not involve VIC RAIL spending considerable •mounts of 
money. 
Again a stalemate had developed. Negotiations between the parties continued, how-
ever few concessions were granted by either VIC RAIL or the unions. The UDioDI COD· 
cerned about the advice from the IHD sought advice from the Workers' Health Reaourco 
Centre. This group, which has a decidedly different outlook from the DID agreed with 
the position adopted by the unions that no safe level of exposure existed. 
VIC RAIL on the other hand, wishing for a quick resolution to the problema notified 
the ACAC of the existence of a dispute. On 17 March, 1978 a meeting between VIC RAIL 
and the unions agreed to a test run of protective equipment for a period of one week. This 
trial however was to be conducted on the "red and silver trains'~. Before this teat period 
was over the dispute came before the ACAC. A number of meetings between VIC RAIL 
and the unions followed, resulting in a compulsory conference of aD parties before the 
ACAC on 31 March, 1978 at the Jolimont workshops. The unions concem that 
Commissioner Walker, along with officials of VIC RAIL, were putting coDSiderable preaure 
on union officials to lift the bans. 
During this conference the unions presented a 1 S-point proposal put forward by the 
Jolimont Shop Committee. 
i. A special change room be set aside for the gear to be worn and that no baas be Hftecl 
until this is provided. 
ii. The special gear be worn by all working on blue trains. 
iii. Supervisors who inspect or check work on blue trains also be required to wear spfdaJ 
gear while in, on, or under, blue trains. 
iv. That more powerful compresson or air lines be provided than were on Pdday, 
3 March. 
v. That no man be disadvantaged in conditions or employntent if he finds it to 
work wearing the gear. 
vi. That nobody be transferred out of the inspection shop who cannot work in 
unless he voluntarily agrees. 
vii. Taking into account those who are unable to work in special par a rolter be wq. 
amongst all others so that everyone has an equal share of working on blue tndnL 
viii. That each employee be issued with his own personal protective gear and 
no inter-changeability of such gear. 
ix. That the length of time that the average person can weu such gear and ceat1m1e 
work comfortably be assessed and no one work longer without a breath•. 
14 The Age, 1 February, 1978, p. S. 
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x. That the unions negotiate an allowance for those who have to work wearing such pro-
tective gear. 
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pie, undated, pp. S8- S9) As a consequence, the unions have resolved to 
that may be given in the future by the nm and to dewlop their own resources u weD • to 
rely on the advice of such groups as the Workers' Health Resource Centre. 
The ACAC became involved in this dispute from 18 Much, 1978, some el&bt montlll 
after the initial bans were placed on all work on the Harris carriages at the Bendigo work· 
shops. At this stage bans were also operating at Newport and Jolimont. Like many cUI-
putes that come before the ACAC a stalemate had been reached and u a coosequence 
options that were awilable at the beginning of the dispute were now no longer acceptable 
· to the parties. Commissioner Walker did not underestimate the serious problen1 before him 
and well understood the feelings of the men involved. On the other band he that 
if a solution was not found quickly the dispute could escalate, causing severe diaruptioa to 
the suburban rail network as well as bringing the issue into a wider arena. To this end the 
Commissioner attempted to deal only with the bans at JoUmont (AustraUan Condliation 
and Arbitration Commission, 1978A, p. 47) but the unions insisted that the outcome must 
be applied simultaneously for all workshops where bans were in force. 
At the arbitration conferences, considerable confusion surrounded what were appropri-
ate asbestos standards to adopt and the type of protection necessary. Becan• of this, the 
unions were not prepared to state their position without referring baclt any new propoaals 
to their medical advisers and ultimately their membership. CoiiUililaioner Walker howewr 
felt that the union officials were unnecessarily delaying proceedings and alOIJI with VIC 
RAIL applied considerable pressure on union officials to get the bans lifted. The union's 
response was the same, for example at the end of the second conference Mr Jobneog 
representing the AMWSU stated: 
If you are seeking an assurance from me, you will be disappointed. We look at the 
situation on the basis of merit with our people and the case you are taJkina about 
involves people who have not been adequately consulted and as a consequence they 
are going their own way . . . . We are not going to lord over our people. (Australiaa 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1978A, p. SO) 
A compulsory conference was then called for 31 March, 197H. l'rior to this meettna 
the J olimont Shop Committee passed a motion expressing concern at the UDClue 
being placed upon their union officials to drop the bans, when litde if any " ... 
being brought to bear on VIC RAIL to accept the proposals put forward by the 
This had little effect as Commissioner Walker in his ope~ remarks stated: 
I made my position quite clear, that I wu not satisfied with the neptiw repliea that 
I had received (from the unions) ... as far u I am concerned this matter hll to be .. 
solved. (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1978B, p. SS) 
In an attempt to get the men to lift the bans the CoiiUililaioner had scheduled tbe 
conference to be held at the Jolimont workshops, summoning members of the shop 
mittee but not notifying the ARU, ETU and AMWSU officials. The unioBJsaw lUI acttea 
as a manoeuvre by which he hoped to get the worken on the job to adopt a more meder· 
ate and conciliatory posture and so split them away from the union leadei•Np ad their 
medical advisers. Although a resolution wu finally achieved at this It left • 
feeling amongst the union officials that the Commissioner wu preoccupied with ....... 
a dispute rather than with equity or the welfare of the men on the job. Theee 
caused the unions involved to question whether the ACAC is the most 
for the resolution of health problems. 
Clearly this dispute has led to doubts being raised about the roles of the 
ACAC in industrial health matters, although on the positiw llde ita iftt1ueBoe c:111 
in two subsequent events. In response to the Broadband programme and the 
RAIL dispute, the Victorian Government in December 1978 gamtted the AlblltOI 
lations (Labour and Industry (Asbestos) Regullltions. 1978). Without aotaa lato $e 
cesses and influences in the development of these regulations, 11 it is lnteJeltlaa tO 
18 For a full report see Gillespie, R. ( 1 980). 
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that the standard adopted was that proposed by the BOHS in 1969 and occurred some 
seven years after Queensland's initial asbestos rules. It has been the subject of much critic-
e main because those actually at risk namely the workers, were not involved in 
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